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Abstract 
The need to protect national critical infrastructure has led to the development of a 
threat analysis framework. The threat analysis framework can be used to identify 
the elements required to quantify threats against critical infrastructure assets and 
provide a means of distributing actionable threat information to critical 
infrastructure entities for the protection of infrastructure assets. This document 
identifies and describes five key elements needed to perform a comprehensive 
analysis of threat: the identification of an adversary, the development of generic 
threat profiles, the identification of generic attack paths, the discovery of 
adversary intent, and the identification of mitigation strategies. 
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Executive Summary 
The movement of critical infrastructure communication architectures to publicly accessible 
communication backbones and the integration of commodity-based information technology 
into control system architectures have impacted the way control systems are being designed 
and used today. Although information technology (IT) systems provide a rich set of 
capability and commonality, they are also inherently vulnerable to a more expansive set of 
threats.  
To be able to reduce the risk from open architectures and IT components introduced into 
critical infrastructures in the energy sector such as oil, gas, and electric power, there is a 
continuous need to evaluate the risk of adversary attack. A comprehensive threat analysis 
process can assist critical infrastructure providers and utility owners to identify how best to 
apply their limited resources in the protection of their infrastructure from malevolent threat.  
To be able to perform proper risk analysis, a framework for threat analysis needs to be 
created to guide the analyst in the process. This document describes a threat analysis 
framework that identifies the critical elements associated with threat identification, impact, 
and mitigation.  
This report identifies and describes five key elements that are needed to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of threat. The first element is adversary identification. The 
identification of high-level adversaries is normally classified and inhibits the proper 
dissemination of actionable threat information to appropriate stakeholders. Because of this 
limitation, the second element of the threat analysis framework allows for the identification 
of adversary characteristics and the development of threat profiles that can describe 
capability in an unclassified environment. This allows the analyst to map classified adversary 
capabilities into an unclassified domain. The third element, based on capabilities defined in 
the second element, identifies generic attack paths that can be pursued by an adversary 
against a system under review. The fourth element relies on a process that can discover in 
near-real time, activities associated with adversaries that may indicate and provide an early 
warning of an adversary’s intent to leverage a discovered vulnerability against a critical 
infrastructure asset. The final element in the threat analysis framework identifies the best 
strategies for mitigation, reducing the overall risk of the infrastructure to compromise. 
Each of the five key elements described above are to be the subject of follow-on research, 
development, and reports.  When used together, these elements embody a comprehensive 
threat analysis capability that can be utilized by those in the energy sector to perform a more 
deterministic threat analysis and to guide the implementation of mitigations toward reducing 
the risk of successful compromise. 
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1 Introduction 
The need to protect national critical infrastructure has led to the development of a threat 
analysis framework that can be used by the Energy Sector. This framework can be used to 
identify the elements required to quantify threats against critical infrastructure assets and 
provide a means of distributing actionable threat information to critical infrastructure entities 
for the protection of infrastructure assets. 
Each of the five key elements described in this report are to be the subject of follow-on 
research, development, and reports.  When used together, these elements embody a 
comprehensive threat analysis capability that can be utilized by those in the energy sector to 
perform a more deterministic threat analysis.  
1.1 Background 
A key component of risk analysis is a definition of the threat against the system. The 
rudimentary defenses put in place on most systems are sufficient to overcome the resources 
and capabilities of the lowest-level threats, but as an adversary’s capabilities, and hence the 
threat level, increase, it becomes less likely that existing defenses can defeat that adversary’s 
attacks and so the risk to the system becomes greater and more difficult to reduce.  
Since the variety of threats is large, it is important to describe the threats in a way that allows 
them to be categorized. In particular, we are not so concerned with each individual threat but 
with the adversary that the threat represents. We really want to know the capabilities of the 
threats we face so we can defend against the range of attacks that a given threat—ideally, the 
threat we may actually face—might deploy. This enables us to generate an appropriate 
defensive strategy rather than reacting piecemeal to each individual indication of threat. 
Our intent is to segment the continuous threat space based on our understanding of 
adversarial capabilities so that we can select a defensive strategy that will be effective against 
the classes of threats facing us, not just against the individual threats for which we have 
direct evidence. This requires an information framework that represents the relevant 
relationships between threats, vulnerabilities, and mitigating tactics. 
1.1.1 Description 
To provide an overall threat analysis capability, a threat analysis framework will be 
developed that identifies the important elements necessary to identify, characterize, and 
mitigate the effects of that threat. For the release of actionable threat information that can be 
used to develop protections for critical infrastructure assets, a series of unclassified threat 
analysis elements must be developed. Most high-level threat information today is classified 
to protect its source and collection methods. This “classifying legacy” of threat information 
also prevents its timely dissemination. To overcome this restriction, an unclassified threat 
analysis framework will need to be developed to identify needed elements of analysis and 
Threat Analysis Framework 
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provide a path for classified information to be used in an unclassified manner while 
maintaining the protection of classified elements. 
One of the most important unclassified elements needed for threat analysis is a threat’s 
capability to carry out a specific type of attack. Current analysis methods tend to concentrate 
on more subjective aspects of political and social motivation structures without identifying 
relevant objective characteristics that can be used to identify attacks a threat might be able to 
perform. As part of additional work being conducted
1
, a generic set of threat profiles will be 
created to categorize threats against a cyber control system. This will help quantify the 
threat’s ability to conduct both cyber and physical operations against a critical infrastructure 
entity’s assets. There is currently no other documented work in the area of threat 
characterization that is developing generic threat profiles to solve this problem. Other 
solutions are reactive in nature, to a specific threat, while this approach allows the critical 
infrastructure provider and utility owner to be proactive. 
There is an additional issue to be considered when evaluating the risk associated with a given 
vulnerability or threat: how likely is it that a threat is capable of identifying and exploiting 
the vulnerability and, indeed, is the threat even thinking along those lines? While many 
analysts recognize the importance of addressing this question, there is at present little in the 
way of systematic, comprehensive methods for arriving at good answers. This situation is 
understandable; the question is a “strategic surprise” problem, and such problems are 
notoriously difficult. To help address this problem, an “analyst-support” tool will be 
delivered as part of this work. This tool takes as input, a potentially large class of 
infrastructure cyber-vulnerabilities, discovers evidence that an adversary is interested in such 
vulnerabilities, and assesses whether the adversary is capable of exploiting such 
vulnerabilities. 
To be able to utilize elements of the threat analysis framework, a relevant scenario will be 
developed to identify a threat against a critical infrastructure and the impact to the 
infrastructure if the threat is realized.  This element of the work package will provide threat 
capability information to all threat-to-consequence modules.   
1.1.2 Historical Information 
Technology is used to improve efficiency and to reduce operating cost in the commercial 
business world, and the utility industry is not immune to this desired state of operation. The 
majority of our nation’s critical infrastructure is privately owned and operated, with the asset 
owners subjected to the same efficient business model stressors as the rest of our commercial 
society. These efficient business decisions also impact the decisions related to the operation 
and security of control systems.  
Currently, the security of utility systems is often inconsistent and sporadic. Both government 
and privately-owned critical infrastructure entities are not fully aware of the capabilities of 
threats that can be leveraged against their assets and thus have not developed mitigation 
strategies for these types of security risks.  
                                                 
1
 Duggan, D. P., et al. (2007). Categorizing threat: Building and using a generic threat matrix, SAND2007-
5791. Sandia National Laboratories. 
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In spite of these short comings, critical infrastructure providers and utility owners must 
continually rely on technology to reduce the costs associated with operations, including staff 
reduction. The reduction of qualified operators, along with an increase in the number of 
interconnected systems, has resulted in a significant increase in the risks associated with 
adversary compromise of control systems today.  
1.1.3 Significance 
The threat analysis elements described in the body of this report create a comprehensive 
threat analysis framework that enables objective determination of threat capabilities and 
supports the ability to identify and prioritize expenditures to mitigate the effects from a class 
of threats, all in an unclassified venue for use by critical infrastructure entities. This report, 
along with other proposed deliverables, will help reduce the risk of energy disruption by 
providing a basis for utility owners to best apply their limited resources in the protection of 
their infrastructure assets from malevolent threat. 
1.1.4 Literature Review 
The comprehensive analysis framework to be developed by this work has not been found to 
exist in any prior DOE or other literature. However, there is a strong history of this type of 
approach within Sandia National Laboratories. In 1999, shortly following President Clinton’s 
call for the development of a system for identifying and preventing major attacks to critical 
infrastructure
2
, James Purvis authored a report on the need for a revision of sabotage 
categories, target types, and consequences and the development of a standardized risk 
assessment methodology for physical protection at nuclear power plants.
3
 Beginning in 1999, 
researchers at Sandia National Laboratories started to assess threats to all critical 
infrastructure assets. Work has been completed on approaches to critical infrastructure 
security,
4
 common vulnerabilities of control systems,
5
 threat-group dynamics,
6
 threat 
assessment,
7,8
 and information sharing.
9
 Most recently, David Duggan has been focusing on 
developing generic profiles of cyber threats
10
 to industrial control systems
11
; this work 
                                                 
2
 The Clinton Administration’s policy on critical infrastructure protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63 
(NSC-63). (1998). 
3
 Purvis, J. W. (1999). Sabotage at nuclear power plants, SAND99-1850C. Sandia National Laboratories. 
4
 Baker, A. B., et al. (2002). A scalable systems approach for critical infrastructure security, SAND2002-0877. 
Sandia National Laboratories. 
5
 Stamp, J., Young, W., & DePoy, J. (2003). Common vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure control systems, 
SAND2003-1772C. Sandia National Laboratories. 
6
 Backus, G.A., & Glass, R. J. (2005). An agent-based model component to a framework for the analysis of 
terrorist-group dynamics, SAND2006-0860P. Sandia National Laboratories. 
7
 Depoy, J., et al. (2006). Critical infrastructure systems of systems assessment methodology, SAND2006-6399. 
Sandia National Laboratories. 
8
 Merkle, P. B. (2006). Extended defense systems: I. Adversary-defender modeling grammar for vulnerability 
analysis and threat assessment, SAND2006-1484. Sandia National Laboratories. 
9
 Hayden, N. K., & Craft, R. L. (2003). The Knowledge Network (KnowNet): Deepening the nation’s 
understanding of terrorist behavior, SAND2004-0476P. Sandia National Laboratories. 
10
 Duggan, D. P. (2005). Generic threat profiles, SAND2005-5411. Sandia National Laboratories. 
11
 Duggan, D. P. (2006). Generic attack approaches for industrial control systems, SAND2006-0650. Sandia 
National Laboratories. 
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continues in the current project by extending the threat profiles to include both kinetic and 
cyber threats
12
. 
Similar to the work being performed at Sandia National Laboratories, researchers from 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) presented a methodology for vulnerability 
a risk assessment using the Homeland-Defense Operational Planning System (HOPS).
13
 
However, although this work proposes a matrix for analyzing threat, it addresses facility-
specific vulnerabilities rather than communication between industry and government 
regarding generic threats. In addition to this work by LLNL, researchers at Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory have proposed the Quantitative Threat-Risk 
Index Model (QTRIM) to compute a quantitative threat-risk index on a system and 
component level.
14
 While the QTRIM approach may be able to predict the probability of 
attack on specific facilities, it focuses on a threat’s selection of a target, seems to require a 
great deal of classified information, and does not perform the same information sharing 
service of which a generic threat profile would be capable. 
The United States Army has also committed a great deal of time to the analysis of terrorism 
and the recognition of terrorist threats to U.S. military forces. A Military Guide to Terrorism 
in the Twenty-First Century
15
 and its supplemental handbooks
16,17
 are intended to support 
military training and education on the Global War on Terrorism. Although these documents 
focus solely on terrorist threats, they do stand as a strong reference for identifying threat 
attributes and for case studies of previous terrorist attacks. 
Appendix A of this report includes a full bibliography of papers and reports relevant to this 
work. 
1.2 Purpose 
One of the primary problems with threat identification and characterization today is the 
resultant information is normally classified. The classified nature of threat information 
inhibits its distribution to entities that need it the most, such as critical infrastructure 
providers and utility owners. It is the intent of this report to identify and describe essential 
threat analysis elements that, when developed, will be used to provide the end user, the 
                                                 
12
 Duggan, D. P., et al. (2007). Categorizing threat: Building and using a generic threat matrix, SAND2007-
XXXX. Sandia National Laboratories. 
13
 Durling, Jr., R. L., Price, D. E., & Spero, K. K. (2005). Vulnerability and risk assessment using the 
Homeland-Defense Operational Planning System (HOPS), UCRL-CONF-209028. International Symposium on 
Systems and Human Science. 
14
 Plum, M. M., Gertman, D. I., & Beitel, G.A. (2004). Novel threat-risk index using probabilistic risk 
assessment and human reliability analysis, INEEL/EXT-03-01117. Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory. 
15
 A military guide to terrorism in the twenty-first century, TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No. 1. Version 3.0. 
(2005). U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 
16
 Terror operations: Case studies in terrorism, DCSINT Handbook No. 1.01. (2005). U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command. 
17
 Cyber operations and cyber terrorism, DCSINT Handbook No. 1.02. (2005). U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command. 
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critical infrastructure owners and operators, with actionable unclassified threat information to 
protect their most critical assets. 
1.2.1 Reason for Investigation 
The primary reason for the development of a threat analysis framework is to capture 
important elements of threat analysis. Once captured, these elements and their inter-
relationships can be described and used to help a threat analyst, or threat advisory group, to 
best characterize threat. After the creation of an accurate threat characterization, the potential 
impact of a threat can be described, allowing determination for the best means of reducing or 
eliminating the risk or mitigating the impact. 
1.2.2 Roadmap Challenges 
As referenced in the Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector
18
 publication, 
control systems are evolving from isolated operating environments using proprietary 
software, hardware, and communications technologies toward scalable inter-connected 
architectures using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and standards-based protocols 
that provide high levels of interoperability. High connectivity and interoperability comes 
with a significant security risk. This risk must be managed and the development of a threat 
analysis framework is an integral part of the overall risk management process. 
1.2.3 Audience 
The end user or audience of threat information can be divided into two different groups: the 
government group and the industry group. The needs of these two distinct customers are not 
identical. Government customers are interested in formulating information to the following: 
1. Can this adversary affect this asset? 
2. What assets can this adversary degrade? 
3. What threats can affect what assets? 
On the other hand, industry customers are formulating their own set of information 
requirements that are much more aligned with the specifics of operations and tangible assets: 
1. What level of capabilities does this threat have? 
2. Is my current architecture protected against this threat?  
3. What mechanisms or approaches can be used to protect against this level of threat? 
4. What are my residual risks? 
It is industry and those government branches not affiliated with intelligence gathering that 
are currently left in the dark when trying to characterize threats due to the classified nature of 
the threat information and the lack of means to propagate specifics of threat information 
because of these classified restrictions. 
1.2.4 Desired Response 
The intention of this research is to provide process control system owners and maintainers 
with comprehensive, actionable threat information concerning the abilities of adversaries that 
                                                 
18
 Eisenhauer, J., et al. (2006). Roadmap to secure control systems in the energy sector. Energetics Incorporated. 
Threat Analysis Framework 
 14 
will allow them to successfully design, develop, and deploy appropriate defenses. 
Additionally, there is a goal to provide the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) with a national 
perspective of higher-level threats with respect to critical infrastructures. 
Producing analytic processes to better define and analyze threats against control systems will 
provide the DOE Office of Electricity (DOE/OE) with the following benefits: 
• The ability to bring national awareness of the risk to the nations’ critical 
infrastructure to cyber attacks, 
• A mechanism for ranking mitigation actions to be performed for avoidance of a 
national disaster, 
• A technical threat analysis capability, 
• A method for providing unclassified, actionable risk information to control 
system owners and maintainers, 
• A greater understanding by the energy sector of the impacts of a sophisticated 
threat, and 
• The ability for DOE to communicate objective threat information to industry. 
The benefit to the nation is that, by protecting critical infrastructure control systems from 
attacks by higher-level adversaries, DOE can help ensure the reliability of energy distribution 
to American citizens. 
1.3 Scope 
One of the primary activities necessary to move classified threat information to the 
unclassified information environment is the development of generic threat profiles that can 
characterize many different levels of threat without associating a name with a classified 
ability. This unclassified threat characterization must be able to bin a full spectrum of 
classified threat capability to allow for analysts from the classified threat environment to map 
the characterization of an “unnamed” threat to an equivalent bin or level of threat in the 
unclassified threat environment. This will then allow analysts in the unclassified environment 
to identify potential attack paths that could be supported by the asserted capability and 
identify proper mitigation steps to thwart attacks. 
1.3.1 Extent and Limits of Investigation 
The framework described in this report identifies the associated elements needed to provide a 
comprehensive approach to threat analysis.  Each element is only described in enough detail 
to provide the reader with an understanding of its role.  Further explanation of the elements 
will be contained in future publications.  Only malevolent threat is considered within the 
framework. 
1.3.2 Goals 
The overall goal of this research is to provide a basis for critical infrastructure providers and 
utility owners to best apply their limited resources in the protection of their infrastructure 
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assets from malevolent threat. The capability being developed and identified in this report 
will provide stakeholders (including oil, gas, and electric industry utility owners and 
operators, control system equipment vendors, policymakers, and other government-related 
programs and activities, such as the International Electricity Infrastructure Assurance Forum) 
with actionable information concerning the abilities of adversaries and the likelihood that a 
threat is capable and willing to attack energy sector resources. A greater understanding of the 
threat will enable oil, gas, and electric utility owners and operators, government 
policymakers, and other key stakeholders to better design, develop, and deploy appropriate 
defenses to defend against the more sophisticated threat. 
1.3.3 Objectives 
The objective of this research is to better define and analyze threats against the energy 
sector’s process control systems in the following way: 
• Provide an overall threat analysis framework for extracting and characterizing 
threat information (adversary and intent) that originates from various intelligence 
organizations to better understand the types of threat facing the energy sector’s 
control systems. This will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
full spectrum of threat.  
• Develop a generic threat profile matrix that can be used to identify and 
characterize the different levels of the adversaries and their capabilities. The 
matrix will reduce the complexity of threat analysis and allow for unclassified, 
actionable risk information to be distributed to potential stakeholders.  
• Implement an analysis tool to identify adversary “chatter” that allows threat 
analysts to determine the visibility of any discovered vulnerability.   
• Develop cyber-based threat scenarios at a local, regional, and national level to 
provide a deeper understanding of the exploitation of vulnerabilities leveraged 
against a critical infrastructure by a threat. 
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2 Approach 
To release actionable risk information that can be used to identify mitigation strategies for 
critical infrastructures, a series of unclassified threat analysis elements must be developed. 
As seen in Figure 2.1, these elements are required to provide the appropriate threat 
information to allow asset owners to position their infrastructure assets for protection from 
adversarial attack. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Threat Analysis Framework 
2.1 Methods 
The method used in this research is to identify and generate the needed elements of threat 
analysis. These can then be used in an unclassified environment to provide a path of analysis 
that starts at adversary identification and ends at risk analysis and mitigation. The method 
includes unique approaches to threat that include adversary characteristics that can bin 
unclassified threat capability, threat discovery that can identify adversary intent, and generic 
attack vectors that can provide a means of mitigation analysis. 
Threat Analysis Framework 
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2.1.1 Threat Characteristic Definition 
Threat characteristic definition allows for identification of classes of attacks. These attack 
classes are biased by characteristics that are used to differentiate adversary capability and bin 
these capabilities into levels. Each level has a different severity of characterization that 
allows for it to be differentiated from levels that may be of higher or lower in value.  For a 
detailed description of the threat attributes refer to Sandia National Laboratories SAND 
report 2007-5791, Categorizing Threat, David Duggan et al. September 2007. 
2.1.2 Threat Attack Paths 
Another essential element in threat analysis is the generation of attack paths. Attack paths 
define the adversary access points and the necessary elements to initiate, sustain, and 
propagate an attack. For this element to be created, a representative architecture must be used 
as a system reference model for the system under review.  
In the case of an electric or gas utility a reference model has been generated.
19
 The reference 
model allows the analyst to identify assets and all applicable attack paths to the compromise 
or destruction of the asset. A reference model also allows for a level of abstraction, making it 
applicable across a wide spectrum of associated systems. Figure 2.2 is an example use of the 
reference model that was created for control system evaluation. 
2.1.3 Realistic Threat Scenario 
The system reference model is supported by the generation of a realistic threat scenario. The 
threat scenario allows for tangible elements of operation and architecture to be introduced 
into the analysis. This includes the identification of specific components or assets of the 
system that are considered critical to the overall operations. Realistic threat scenario 
development will provide the following aspects for consideration: 
1. A relevant critical infrastructure. 
2. A viable attack or set of attacks that can lead to a substantial consequence, where the 
consequence has been provided by a system owner/operator or by the government.  
3. The vetting or validation of the scenario’s system description, system operations, 
system architecture with industry partners, subject matter experts and other interested 
parties. 
4. The analysis needed to specify and characterize modeling of the scenario. 
5. The dissemination of threat analysis results to all interested parties for review and 
comment. 
2.1.4 Real-Time Vulnerability Analysis 
Another important threat analysis element that must be considered when evaluating the risk 
associated with a given vulnerability is how likely it is that a vulnerability has been identified 
by a threat. Or, in other words, is an attack being formulated by a threat interested in 
exploitation? While many analysts recognize the importance of addressing this question, 
there is at present little in the way of systematic, comprehensive methods for arriving at good 
                                                 
19
 Stamp, J., Berg, M., & Baca, M. (2005). Reference model for control in automation systems in electric power, 
SAND2005-6286P. Sandia National Laboratories. 
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answers. This situation is understandable; it is a “strategic surprise” problem, which is 
notoriously difficult.  
 
Figure 2.2 Example Use of Control System Reference Model 
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To address this shortfall, a proof-of-concept design is being developed to answer two primary 
questions: 
1. Are any threats discussing aspects of exploiting a specific vulnerability? 
2. Could the threat find enough information about a vulnerability to develop an attack? 
These questions and similar ones are addressed through an automated computational 
exploration of open-source data sets, primarily the World Wide Web (WWW).  Data sets to 
be used for this threat discovery and assessment are expected to include the World Wide 
Web (e.g., the Dark Web Portal
20
 hosted at the University of Arizona), intelligence 
community reporting, and open-source literature and media. 
The process of answering these questions involves an actively archived collection of web 
pages and other web objects which are associated with potential threats. A Net Discovery 
methodology automatically explores large regions of these archives and discovers web pages 
that are authoritative in the WWW and that explicitly encourage the search for aspects of the 
threat scenario. The second question is answered by applying a Net Discovery “interesting 
science” discovery tool to both the WWW and other publication data sets to identify potential 
attack information. The extraction of information from both of these types of queries allows 
the analyst to determine the imminent viability of an attack. 
2.1.5 Protection Strategies 
The final element of threat analysis constitutes threat mitigation. This element provides the 
information necessary to properly thwart a threat. The level, or rigor, of mitigation will be 
directly proportional to the level of threat. This will take into account how much resources 
must be expended to neutralize the threat. Each mitigation strategy will allow the critical 
infrastructure owner or operator to select mitigation techniques that limit the restriction to 
operations but maximize the protection from the threat. The threat mitigation element will 
also include the residual risk remaining after a mitigation strategy is chosen. 
2.2 Assumptions 
No assumptions were made in the development of the threat analysis framework concerning 
the type of control system or energy sector participant. 
                                                 
20
 “Dark Web Terrorism Research.” (2005). University of Arizona. 
http://ai.arizona.edu/research/terror/index.htm. 
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3 Conclusions 
The elements identified in this document allow for a full-spectrum approach to threat 
identification and management. Using the process embodied in the framework, it will be 
possible to answer questions from government on the security of the critical infrastructure 
systems and those questions from industry about the capabilities of threats as well as possible 
mitigation strategies to protect against those threats. 
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4 Recommendations 
We recommend pursuing the plan objects outlined in this report. The plan outline included 
the identification and development of the following elements: 
• Provide an overall threat analysis framework for extracting and characterizing 
threat information (adversary and intent) that originates from various intelligence 
organizations to better understand the types of threat facing the energy sector’s 
control systems. This will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
full spectrum of threat.  
• Develop a generic threat profile matrix that can be used to identify and 
characterize the different levels of threat adversaries and capabilities. The matrix 
will reduce the complexity of threat analysis and allow for unclassified, actionable 
risk information to be distributed to potential stakeholders.  
• Implement an analysis tool to identify adversary “chatter” that allows the threat 
analysts to determine the visibility of any discovered vulnerability.   
• Develop cyber-based threat scenarios at a local, regional, and national level to 
provide a deeper understanding of the exploitation of vulnerabilities leveraged 
against a critical infrastructure by an adversarial threat. 
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Appendix B: Acronyms 
COTS Commercial off-the-shelf 
DOE Department of Energy 
DOE/OE Department of Energy Office of Electricity 
HOPS Homeland-Defense Operational Planning System 
IT Information Technology 
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
NSTB National SCADA Test Bed 
QTRIM Quantitative Threat-Risk Index Model 
WWW World Wide Web 
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 Appendix C: For More Information 
National SCADA Testbed (NSTB) 
Project 
Jennifer DePoy, Manager (jdepoy@sandia.gov) 
Critical Infrastructure Systems Sandia National 
Laboratories 
P.O. Box 5800 
Albuquerque, New Mexico  87185 
ieRoadmap 
 
http://www.energetics.com/csroadmap/index.aspx 
Interactive Energy Roadmap to Secure Control 
Systems 
Energetics Incorporated 
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